What's it worth?

Recently I was kicking around some ideas with my daughter who is working on her literature dissertation on the 'lost generation'. One of the topics we were wrestling with was what does or does not belong to the field of literary inquiry or literary scholarship. A day or so later I found myself trying to help my nephew with an assignment from his undergraduate micro-economics course and was vainly coming to terms with the real purpose of the exercise. It was after this that I realized that in both cases, the actual subject of the discussion was the same: what does it mean?

Meaning is one of those words that is some people use too much and others too rarely. For some, it is an ambiguous, not-very-helpful category. For others it is the central issue in their lives. That's quite a range to cover, that's for sure, and is so often the case, the truth most likely lies somewhere in-between.

One point that came up in the literature discussion is that the discipline itself is not really concerned with whether the world is a better place or whether we, as individuals, are any smarter as a result of our pursuing it. Why an author writes something -- so the theory goes -- is irrelevant. All we have is the text in its historical context and we have to deal with what we find. The only meaning worth anything is the textual meaning, that is, the meaning we find in the words as they are strung together in that particular place at that particular time, and perhaps under those particular conditions. It is, let us say, a rather focused view of meaning.

In the economics discussion, it became clear that my nephew isn't studying business and economics so that the world will become a better place. In fact, it became clear to me that the search for and discovery of the so-called 'laws' of economic activity do not concern themselves for any given state of the world. We only have the slope of a given curve, that occurs at a particular place at a particular time, and under a certain set of conditions. The question of meaning ... what does that mean? ... is never even asked.

The philosopher Günther Anders once noted, ""Human beings are ashamed to have been born instead of made." It would seem that literary theorists and economists are ashamed to be only scholars, not scientists. The analogy is not as far-fetched as one might think. Science, in the sense of counting, measuring, and standardizing, but also in the sense of discovering, researching, and studying has become the non plus ultra of intellectual striving. Only what can be counted counts, is the watchword of the day. We find this approach at the heart of most academic disciplines these days, from astrophysics to accounting (whereby I am still having trouble conceiving of accounting as an academic discipline, but that's another story). The human and social sciences have made themselves no exception. They wanted to be sciences, too. The English language, however, keeps them out, for we have taken the word 'science' from its original meaning in Latin and made it into something that it isn't: a way of life. Science, as a term, derives from the Latin sciro, 'I know'. Yes, we've turned a way of knowing into a way of life. The only problem is, what do we know any more?

What we know ... and if you don't believe me, just ask those bright young guys who own Google ... is merely information. We have tons and tons of information, but do we have any knowledge? I can't help but think of Eliot's "Where is the wisdom we have lost in knowledge?/Where is the knowledge we have lost in information?" (from The Rock, 1934) T.S. was onto something there. (Well, actually, he was on to much, much more, for the line preceding those two is "Where is the Life we have lost in living?", and that puts it all into a much more existential context, but that, too, is a matter for another time). Information is just information. May 8 is just May 8, no more, no less. Even May 8, 1945 is just another day that slipped by in history unless I know (and here is where we come closer to the issue) that it was on that particular day that Germany surrendered ending World War II in Europe. It's still not knowledge, it's just a fact, but it is a piece of knowledge when we use it to make clear to another that terror and fascism of one type was bid halt by its successor. We need to think about what we mean when we use the term 'knowledge'. After all, it is more than just information, it is information in service of a purpose greater than itself.

That terror and fascism were bid halt is obviously a good thing. The part of that sentence about its successor will make some readers uneasy. And that's the very reason that it was added. This isn't a test, don't get me wrong, but while most of us agree on the first part of the statement, there are more than just a few who would accept the second part. Why is that? To me, it is clear: because it expresses a value that some folks may or may not agree is truly a value. The implication in the sentence is that that which followed wasn't all that much better than what came before. How could I possibly compare democracy with fascism? Well, I'm not really. When we consider that fascism is a type of economic organization, then its successor, that is, the system which we chose to replace it was either communism in the East bloc or capitalism in the West. The fact that those eastern economies called themselves democratic this or that has nothing to do with ignorance on their part, rather ignorance on ours, in the West. Democracy can be defined in any number of ways. There is no one, accepted, valid definition of what the term may mean. There are variations on the others (fascism, capitalism and communism), to be sure, but the span of variation is much smaller.

My point is that it is only now that we find ourselves in the sphere of 'knowledge'. Up until now, everything was just information, and it was all stuff that is more or less 'who cares'. The Soviet Union was communist. The United States was capitalist. The fascists had been defeated so we imposed our respective form of economic organization upon the losers (capitalism in West Germany, and communism in East Germany). That is as far as information gets us. The real question is, however, what difference does it make. In reality, not very much at all. For what we have are merely facts. Pure, simple, objective, indisputable, non-arguable facts. When we move to the next level, if you will, to knowledge, we start entering the realm of meaning, the realm where subtle, but important differences are important. Some think communism was a good thing. Some think capitalism is the best thing. In both cases, however, it is a value (judgment) that we have placed upon the fact that makes all the difference. In other words, when it comes to knowledge, values matter.

And here we have the rub. Knowledge is never value-free. Facts are. Knowledge isn't. What makes the difference is the values we associate with what we know. And that brings us full circle to science once again. Science and our modern worldview would like us to think that things are just the way they are, but for all the objectivity that science would like to impose (and other disciplines would like to embrace) in the end, it just isn't there, for science's own view of its non-valueness is, at bottom, just another value. We can't escape values. That things should have not meaning other than their own description is a value. Not wanting to deal with the messiness and fuzziness that values bring with them is something science would like to avoid. It doesn't like it, it avoids it, it thinks it just complicates things ... there are so many ways to describe it ... but in the end, they are just values.

Science, in its desire to free itself of values has really only driven out the Devil with Beelzebub. Their view of the world has brought us a heap of information. There's no question about that at all. But it cannot be the final arbiter of things, for to say it should or it shouldn't requires that one have values. To determine what is preferable or not preferable, what we desire or what we abhor, what is good or what is bad requires us to have values. Describing the world in such an objective way is perhaps value-free, but in the end, it is really just of no value at all: it is worthless.

Innocuous?

Words are anything but innocuous. They are perhaps one of the most powerful tools we have. They are deceiving, though, because their power is so subtle. Magicians know of their power, but magicians are not given much credit these days, but ignoring words is a rather futile strategy. It can give us a break for a while, but it can never solve the problem. You see, 'ignoring' and 'ignorance' stem from the same root. They have more in common that we might like to admit.

I just read a tweet and a blog from two intelligent, thinking individuals who were amazed -- at least that's the impression they made -- that a for-profit educational institution put profits before students. Really? How amazing is that? The name says it all: for-profit. The raison d'etre of the organization is profit, not education.

Oddly enough I've had personal experience with one of the instituions that this group manages. When I got my own MBA, the mantra being chanted was 'the purpose of business is the maximization of profits'. This was, by the way, the same mantra that was being chanted in every for- and not-for-profit of higher (so-called) education all across the land. I have a nephew who's now studying (undergraduate) business administration at a respected German university, and his profs are instilling the same mantra in him. It's time to wake up folks: it's all about the money. If profits and money were only a business problem, I don't think I'd mind all that much. My friend Julius (Caesar) used to remind me of an old saying in his day: caveat emptor (let the buyer beware). This isn't anything new. And, if you stop to think about it, individuals who's highest ideal has been money have been cutting corners, stretching the truth, outright tricking and deceiving their customers since long before Julius' day as well. In fact, long before Julius a wise man once noted that the love of money is the root of all evil. That was a very wise man.

No, my problem, if you will, is that we have taken the vocabulary over into other areas of life where it has little, if any, business at all (if you'll excuse the pun). Areas like education, for example: Why do students have to buy in to the curriculum? What does ownership of learning really mean? Since when should learning be considered an investment? And these are just a couple of the most obvious.

Part of this shift in usage, of course, is directly related to the fact that we have turned our society into an economy. Social notions, like community, welfare, and public, have all taken on negative connotations. We just don't like them very much any more. We prefer words of power (just like magicians): economic words.

These aren't just words. Words quite often stand for ideas and for ideals. People are willing to die for ideals ... not for words, mind you, but the ideals that those words come to represent. This is a normal, natural process, and because it is so, we should be a bit more careful when engaging in it. We should say what we mean, but more importantly, we should mean what we say.

Eteology

It is the comprehensiveness of this term that has brought us to choose it as the prime means of describing Gebser's approach. The new structure of consciousness to which we are transitioning demands new means, new processes, and new methods. It should be repeated that this ushering in of the new in no way indicates or dictates a discarding of what has come before, far from it. We must keep in mind that it is the activity and presence of the past that distinguishes Gebser's approach from others. Supercession does not mean invalidating; replacement in this context intimates an intensification rather than a nullification. Nevertheless, the inevitability of this transition should be recognized as well. This particular term best illustrates this new way of understanding. Eteology is then a new form of statement. But it should be noted:

We are speaking advisedly of "forms of statement" here and not of forms of representation. Only our concept of "time" is a representational form, bound -- like all forms of representation -- to space. The search for a new form of representation would give rise to the error of establishing a new philosopheme at the very moment that philosophy of an individual stamp is over. What is necessary today to turn the tide of our situation are not new philosophemes like the phenomenological, ontological, or existential, but eteologemes.

Eteology must replace philosophy just as philosophy once replaced the myths. In the eteologemes, the eteon or being-in-truth comes to veracity or statement of truth, and the "wares" or guards verity and conveys the "verition" which arises from the a-waring and imparting of truth. Eteology, then, is neither a mere ontology, that is, theory of being, nor is it a theory of existence. The dualistic question of being versus non-being which is commensurate only with the mental structure is superseded by eteology, together with the secularized question as to being, whose content -- or more exactly whose vacuity -- is nothing more than existence. Every eteologeme is a "verition," and as such is valid only when it allows origin to become transparent in the present. To do this it must be formulated in such a way as to be free of ego, and this means not just free of subject but also free of object; only then does it sustain the verity of the whole. This has nothing to do with representation; only in philosophical thought can the world be represented; for the integral perception of truth, the world is pure statement, and thus "verition." (EPO, p309)

We can see, then, that this approach places great demands upon us all. It is not sufficient to merely describe or approximate, rather we are required to show what is in its fullest essence. This has, I believe, far-reaching ramifications for science and its allocation of recognition and funding. The actual contribution of knowledge, its freedom from the constraints imposed upon the researcher due to fiscal, economic, academic or political reasons must all be let go in favor of a direct, revelation of truth. This will not be an easy task for many, especially those who are bound to what is "right" as opposed to what is "true." We see this reflected in all aspects of our societal lives. Eteology is an approach of liberation.

It will be noted that we have not attempted a systematization of criteria and measures that are to be used in our subsequent evaluations. This would be out of step with the free-form nature of the approach described thus far. Yet Gebser does not leave us without assistance in this regard. He provides a list of key terms that will assist in identifying the themes and motifs of the aperspectival world, and these are:

The whole,
integrity,
transparency (diaphaneity),
the spiritual (the diaphainon),
the supercession of the ego,
the realization of timelessness,
the realization of temporicity,
the realization of the concept of time,
the realization of time-freedom (the achronon),
the disruption of the merely systematic,
the incursion of dynamics,
the recognition of energy,
the mastery of movement,
the fourth dimension,
the supercession of patriarchy,
the renunciation of dominance and power,
the acquisition of intensity,
clarity (instead of mere wakefulness),
and the transformation of the creative inceptual basis. (EPO, pp361-362)

The focus here has been Gebser's approach to understanding the unfoldment of human consciousness. The first part dealt exclusively with the model examining each of Gebser's structures of consciousness in turn: the Archaic, Magical, Mythical, Mental, and Integral. We saw the Archaic structure could best be described as a zero- dimensional, non-perspectival world which could be likened to a state of deep sleep. It was characterized by non-differentiation and the total absence of any sense of separation from the environment. This was a world of identity between self and surroundings; not a world in which we could speak of consciousness in any terms that would be meaningful to our modern understanding of the term. By contrast, the Magical structure was characterized by a certain separateness, but not a total separation by any means. Dimensionally this could be described as one-dimensional; a pre-perspectival state of timelessness and spacelessness. It was likened to a state of sleep. Magic man was much a part of his environment, to be sure, and felt secure only within his group, his tribe or clan. It was the transition from the Archaic to Magic structure of consciousness that has probably been mythologically captured in the story of the "Fall of Man." The clothing of knowledge in myth is what characterized the transition to the Mythical structure of consciousness, the two-dimensional, unperspectival state of consciousness that can best be likened to a dream. Imagination and attunement with natural rhythms became important factors in man's life. The separation begun in the Magic structure reaches a tensional climax in the Mythical. This structure is superseded by the Mental structure, whose appearance coincides with the rise of Greek civilization. In this regard, it can be seen that modern thought disregards a good deal of mankind's history, for it is to the Greeks that we most often trace our intellectual roots. By comparison, the Mental structure of consciousness is a three-dimensional, perspectival world that we described with the term wakefulness. The polar tensions of mythology are replaced by the analytical separation of duality and opposition. Thinking is primary, and in its latter phase rational thinking is primary. But this structure, too, is yielding to a final mutation which Gebser identifies as the Integral structure of consciousness. This is described as a four-dimensional, aperspectival world of transparency. This is a time-free, space-free, subject- and object-free world of verition.

Finally, we examined the methodological aspects of Gebser's approach. Here, three fundamental notions were involved: systasis, synairesis, and eteology. The first term, systasis, best describes Gebser's approach. It was seen that systasis goes beyond mere synthesis, which is a mental-rational concept, to achieve a total integration of all parts simultaneously. Synairesis was the means of achieving the end just described. It emphasized the how of such total grasping, namely by the mind or spirit. It is synairesis that enables us to achieve the transparency that is indicative of the Integral structure of consciousness. Finally, eteology replaces philosophy as the way of knowing and acquiring knowledge. Eteology becomes the statement of truth in lieu of the philosophical statement about truth. We saw that this approach goes beyond the limitations of space- and time-perception to a complete and liberating understanding of the whole. It should be noted that this transition is in process; it is not yet a completed act.

References
Gebser, J. (1986) The Ever-present Origin, Authorized translation by Noel Barstad with Algis Mikunas, Athens/OH, Ohio University Press [originally published 1949]. (EPO)

Systasis & Synairesis

Each structure has had its "method" even if it was not characterized as such. Magic and the ritualistic invocation of other powers is a method, whether we recognize it as such or not. Visualization and mystical contemplation is also a method of knowledge acquisition and it served a useful and valuable purpose at one point in our development. In the transition from Mythical to Mental, however, a rejection of previous method arose, particularly in our now deficient, Rational structure. This was part of a natural process, I believe, for the rational cannot tolerate anything other than itself. This in no way negates the value of the mental approach for the scientific method has proven to be a very useful, albeit limited, way to garner knowledge. But, just as the scientific method became the predominant means of acquiring and evaluating knowledge in the Mental structure of consciousness, a new structure demands a new method. This is the dynamic aspect, then, of Gebser's approach. Two notions characterize this methodology and both are newly coined terms: systasis and synairesis, and it is upon these that we will focus our attention.

It is difficult to separate these concepts for they are intimately related to one another. What is more, such an artificial separation is indicative of a mental-rational approach, to which we are trying not to fall prey. It should be remembered that the analytical separation demanded of this approach ultimately ends in death, and it is life, the birth of a new method, that we seek. The method which Gebser describes is predicated on the idea of the eteologeme which was introduced earlier. It is this "being-in-truth" which lies at the heart of his approach. Up until now, particularly within the scientific community, the necessary, sometimes forceful, separation of subject and object has been required. It is this dualism that must be transcended if we are to arrive at a more comprehensive, intensive understanding of the world around us and ourselves. Consequently, Gebser's approach should not be considered the building of a system in our current understanding of the term, for such would also be a product of a three-dimensional mentality.

But, the question arises, "What lies beyond system?" And to answer this particular question, Gebser coins a neologism to describe his approach, namely systasis, which he defines as, if you will, "the conjoining or fitting together of parts into integrality" (EPO, p310), "a process whereby partials merge or are merged with the whole" (EPO, p292). This is a subtle and difficult concept to understand completely and in all its ramifications. It has in common with system building that the end result is a greater or better comprehension than at the outset of the process. System, however, deals always with parts, not with the whole. Also, system deals primarily with the product rather than the process. Gebser goes on:

[Systasis'] acategorical element is the integrating dimension by which the three- dimensional spatial world, which is always a world of parts, is integrated into a whole in such a way that it can be stated. This already implies that it is not an ordering schema paralleling that of system. We must especially avoid the error of considering systasis -- which is both process and effect -- as that which is effected, for if we do we reduce it to a causal system. We must be aware that systasis has an effective character within every system. Systasis is not a mental concept, nor is it a mythical image (say) in the sense of Heraclitus' panta rei ("all things are in flux"), nor is it a magic postulation of the interconnection of everything to and with everything else. And finally, it is not integral, but integrating (EPO, p310).

Or as Feuerstein phrases it, "Systasis, in contrast to systematization, deals with the proper 'arrangement' of intensities (rather than quantified 'extensities')" (Feuerstein, 1987, p194)

What, then (to express it in mental rational terms), is the aim of this method. We have spoken of increased understanding, of more complete comprehension, but these are only approximations. It is here that Gebser introduces the second of this important pair of notions, namely synairesis "which is an integral understanding, or perception, of reality" (Feuerstein, 1987, pp194-195). More specifically, Gebser notes,

Synairesis comes from synaireo, meaning "to synthesize, collect," notably in the sense of "everything being seized or grasped on all sides, particularly by the mind or spirit" (Menge & Güthling, 1910, p542). Whereas synthesis is a logical-causal conclusion, a mental (trinitary) unification of thesis and antithesis (and falls apart because it becomes itself a thesis as a result of the dividing, perspectival perception), synairesis is an integral act of completion "encompassing all sides" and perceiving aperspectivally (EPO, p312, Note 5).

And again: The synairesis which systasis makes possible integrates phenomena, freeing us in the diaphany of "a-waring" or perceiving truth from space and time (EPO, p311).

This freedom from space and time is an important notion in Gebser's entire approach, not just in his method. It will be remembered that one of the key features of this approach is its incorporation of the notions of latency and transparency. What has passed is not dropped and forgotten (although this is what the mental-rational structure of consciousness tempts us to do), rather it is incorporated into our mentation as effective elements thereof. As Feuerstein has pointed out, "it is this insight into the continuing presence and efficacy of the past that distinguishes Gebser's model of the unfolding of human consciousness from other similar attempts" (Feuerstein, 1987, p192). I would hasten to add that it is the equal efficacy of the future that rounds out and completes Gebser's poignant insight. Feuerstein writes,

And that [synairetic] perception, or "verition," occurs on the basis of the integration of archaic presentiment, magical attunement (or what Gebser calls "symbiosis"), mythical symbolization, and mental-rational systematization in the integrative act of arational systasis. Here it is important to remember that all structures are co-present (and co- active) in us and hence need not be invoked through historical imagination' (Feuerstein, 1987, p195).

Not being bound by merely past or future is a theme that has permeated much of our discussion of Gebser thus far. This time- and space-free approach introduces a further dimension to our ability to perceive and state:

By introducing systasis into simple methodology, we are able to evince a new "method" which is not longer three-dimensional. This new method is four-dimensional diaphany; in this what is merely conceivable and comprehensible becomes transparent. Diaphany is based on synairesis, on the eteological completion of systasis and system to an integral whole, for integrality is only possible where "temporal" elements and spatial magnitudes are brought together synairetically. The concept which makes possible the "comprehension" or, more exactly, the perception of the "temporal elements" is that of systasis. If we also take into account the systatic concepts, the mere methodology of systems is intensified to synairetic diaphany; and this must be achieved unless we are to remain caught in the three-dimensional scheme of thought. (EPO, p334) [1]

In its supercession of three-dimensionality, Gebser's method firmly entrenches the observer in the process of perception and "waring." This grounding, if you will, is described by Gebser through the term "concretion," "the integrative act by which otherwise merely abstract proposition are anchored in actual life" (Feuerstein, 1987, p198) Consequently, this approach is immanently practical, yet does not fall prey to the weaknesses of pragmatism, namely its relativism and short-term expediency. It demands that the observer be as aware of his own role in the process as being aware of the process, and its results themselves.
The integrator, then, is compelled to have not only concretized the appearances, be they material or mental, but also to have been able to concretize his own structure. This means that the various structures that constitute him must have become transparent and conscious to him; it also means that he has perceived their effect on his life and destiny, and mastered the deficient components by his insight so that they acquire the degree of maturity and equilibrium necessary for any concretion. Only those components that are in this way themselves balanced, matured, and mastered concretions can effect an integration. (EPO, p99)

The means of knowing and knowledge itself become integral aspects of Gebser's methodological approach. The mere illumination of what was not previously known and understood, that is philosophy, must then yield to eteology, or being-in-truth. "The Greek word eteos means 'true, real'; as an adverb, eteon means 'in accord with truth, truly, really' and comes from the root se:es, meaning "to be" (EPO, p312, Note 4).

Notes
[1] It is also interesting to note that Arthur Young develops his Geometry of Meaning on an increase of dimensionality as well. Although approaching the matter from quite different perspectives, their conclusions are remarkably similar in many regards. The notion of dimensionality, therefore, may be more fundamental than we generally suppose.

References
Feuerstein, G. (1987) Structures of Consciousness: The Genius of Jean Gebser - An Introduction and Critique, Lower Lake/CA, Integral Publishing.

Gebser, J. (1986) The Ever-present Origin, Authorized translation by Noel Barstad with Algis Mikunas, Athens/OH, Ohio University Press [originally published 1949]. (EPO)

Menge, H. & O. Güthling (1910) Menge-Güthling, Griechisch-deutsches Wörterbuch, 28th edn, Berlin, Langenscheidt.

Young, A. (1976) Geometry of Meaning, Mill Valley/CA, Richard Briggs, Associates.